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At the time of its passage in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) was heralded as the twentieth century's Emancipation Proclamation
and Bill of Rights for an estimated forty-three million individuals with
disabilities.' Broadly worded in its prohibition against discrimination in
employment, public services, transportation, and public accommodations,
the ADA is admittedly the most comprehensive piece of disability civil
rights legislation ever enacted, profoundly affecting what it means to be
disabled.2 The expansive scope of the ADA was premised on Congress's
factual findings that the number of disabled Americans would grow as the
population ages, that disabled Americans often have no legal recourse to
redress discrimination, and that people with disabilities face serious social,
vocational, economic, and educational disadvantages.3 Title I, the subject
of this paper, prohibits state and municipal employers, private employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations from discriminating in
employment against qualified individuals with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the job.4
In the more than ten years since the ADA was enacted, the media's
often misleading and exaggerated portrayals of plaintiff victories under the
ADA have resulted in a public that negatively perceives and grossly
misunderstands the ADA.5 Because of the media's statements that the
ADA has created a "lifelong buffet of perks, special breaks and procedural
f Ms. Kaiser is a 2003 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 464-66; 135 CONG. REc. S10,789 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
2. Arlene Mayerson, The Americans with Disabilities Act - An Historic Overview, 7
LAB. LAW. 1, 1-2 (1991).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101(a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(6)
(1990).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,112.
5. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99 (1999) (discussing how the United States Commission on
Civil Rights has blamed the media for the public's misperceptions about the ADA).
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protections" for people with questionable disabilities6 and is used "to
trigger an avalanche of frivolous suits clogging federal courts," the public
inaccurately believes that many ADA plaintiffs are undeservedly and
unjustifiably compensated.7
But according to one management attorney, "No plaintiff's attorney in
his right mind will now take on an ADA contingency fee case and expect to
make any money."8  Although the statistics vary by a few percentage
points, the consensus of academics, the American Bar Association, and
practitioners for both employers and employees is that employers prevail in
over ninety percent of ADA Title I cases at the trial court level and in
eighty-four percent of cases at the appellate level.9 These statistics belie
the perception that the ADA creates a windfall for plaintiffs. Instead, they
demonstrate the need for reform of a statute whose "heart has been cut out"
by the courts.' In construing and applying Title I of the ADA, courts have
defied congressional intent and limited the scope of the ADA to a very
narrow class of plaintiffs. One plaintiffs' attorney laments that with the
exception of the obviously disabled-the wheelchair-bound, the blind, and
the deaf-"the ADA is basically dead" for most prospective plaintiffs." It
may seem incomprehensible that the "Emancipation Proclamation" and the
"Bill of Rights" for disabled individuals has been reduced to such a largely
ineffective tool. However, the courts' restrictive reading of the ADA has
deterred plaintiffs from bringing claims and has predominantly resulted in
plaintiffs' defeat where they have either ignorantly or defiantly dared to
challenge their statistical odds. Such abounding defeat has left plaintiffs,
plaintiffs' attorneys, and academics wondering how the promise of the
ADA has so quickly become an empty promise for the intended
beneficiaries of the ADA while providing a near promise of victory for
employers.
This paper will examine the factors that operate in conjunction to
6. Id. (quoting Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997,
at 16, 18).
7. Id. (quoting Trevor Armbrister, A Good Law Gone Bad, READER'S DIGEST, May 1,
1998, at 145, 149).
8. Vicki Wilmarth, Employer's Advocate: Court Hands Employers ADA Victories,
AMARILLO GLOBE NEWS, Sept. 1, 2002, available at http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/090
102/bus_bj090102-16.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
9. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001).
There is no reason to distinguish between employment discrimination cases brought
against public and private entities because Title II ADA employment discrimination cases
against public employers incorporate the legal standards of Title I. Id. at 241.
10. Lisa I. Fried, Parsing Disability Law: Court's ADA Rulings Are Tough on
Plaintiffs, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1999, at 5.
11. Tamara Loomis, Disabilities Act: High Court Decision Does Not Put End to
Claims, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2001, at 5.
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deprive the ADA of its force in protecting disabled employees. First, I will
outline the types of cases brought under the ADA and the statistics
documenting the remarkable success rate for employers under the ADA. I
will then explain why plaintiffs and the plaintiff bar may nonetheless
continue to initiate and appeal ADA cases. Second, I will delineate several
potential factors that can explain the primarily pro-defendant outcomes
under the ADA, namely: (1) the courts' abuse of the summary judgment
device; (2) the courts' failure to defer to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidance; (3) the apparent hostility of
certain judges, especially in conservative circuits, to ADA claims; (4) the
EEOC's infrequent participation in litigation; and (5) the Supreme Court's
use of the ADA's flexible and ambiguous statutory language to narrow the
grounds for recovery under the ADA. Third, I will explore the remaining
options for ADA advocates, which principally include either lobbying for
congressional reform of the ADA to elucidate its statutory intent or turning
to state law as a substitute for the ADA. Ultimately, I conclude that both of
these alternatives prove unsatisfactory, particularly in light of the current
legal and political climate.
I. PRO-DEFENDANT OUTCOMES IN ADA TITLE I CASES
A. Types of Claims Raised Under the ADA
A report on the EEOC's litigation docket from 1992 through March of
1998 reveals the types of ADA cases that the EEOC handled during this
period of extensive plaintiff loss. 12 In this timeframe the EEOC resolved
180 cases and was handling ninety-eight active ones. 3 Of these 278 active
and resolved cases, 470 charges of discrimination were outlined (many
cases involved more than one discrimination charge). 14 Forty-six percent
of the cases were related to hiring and employment status, with charges
about hiring policies and actions and terminations the most prominent.
1 5
Twenty percent dealt with the failure of employers to provide reasonable
accommodations.16 Eighteen percent involved treatment by employers,
including terms and conditions of employment, retaliation for complaints,
harassment and hostile work environments, and violations of
confidentiality.1 7  Nine percent dealt with unlawful disability-related
12. Stephen L. Percy, Administrative Remedies and Legal Disputes: Evidence on Key
Controversies Underlying Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 413,418 (2000).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at418-19.
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inquiries. 1  Six percent involved the discriminatory effects of disability
benefits and health insurance coverage.' 9 The report reveals wide variety in
the type of conditions experienced by the plaintiffs, including life-
threatening conditions (e.g., cancer), congenitally induced disabilities,
learning and attention deficit disorders, hearing and vision impairments,
loss of limbs due to workplace accidents, depression, and back problems or
injury.2° Many types of entities were charged with discrimination under the
ADA, ranging from small private concerns to major corporations.2'
B. Statistics Documenting the Pro-Defendant Outcomes in ADA
Title I Cases
Despite the diversity of claims asserted, disabilities alleged, and
employers sued, ADA employment discrimination plaintiffs almost
uniformly lose. Only plaintiffs in prisoner rights cases fare as poorly as
ADA plaintiffs.22 Plaintiffs in litigation involving comparable areas of law,
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, succeed at much higher
rates than ADA plaintiffs.23 Between 1992 and 1998, defendants won in
approximately 93% of reported ADA employment discrimination cases
decided at the trial court level.24  Thirty-eight percent were decided on
18. Id. at419.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Colker, supra note 5, at 100.
23. Id. See also Colker, supra note 9, at 252 (noting the differences between Title VH
suits alone as compared to when they are included with ADA actions).
24. Colker, supra note 5, at 109. The statistics from this article are based on an
examination of all ADA appellate employment discrimination decisions available on
Westlaw since the ADA became effective in 1992 through July 1998, supplemented by a
few additional cases available through other electronic services. Id. at 103. Ms. Colker also
examined the aggregate trial court outcome data for these ADA employment discrimination
cases. Id. However, as the author concedes, there are methodological problems with
relying on published opinions only. Id. at 104. In fact, ADA outcomes are probably more
pro-defendant than this data indicates because the data only reflect those cases where judges
published opinions available to the public. Id. at 105. Many summary opinions in favor of
defendants are not published, such as motions for summary judgment and dismissals. Id.
To assess trial court outcomes, the author analyzed data from the American Bar Association
of final trial court outcomes, including both state and federal trial courts. Id. at 109. More
than 90% of the cases are in federal trial courts. Id. at 109 n.45. "The data only include
employment cases against ADA Title I defendants and exclude cases brought against public
entities. Moreover, the data do not screen out frivolous litigation." Id. See also Colker,
supra note 9, at 246 (discussing "selection bias" in the analysis of ADA cases on appeal).
The database for this article consists of appellate ADA employment discrimination
decisions that are available on Westlaw. Id. at 244. Thus, this database "cannot precisely
answer the question of what percentage of ADA cases result in favorable verdicts. It can
only tell us how the appellate system handles those verdicts on appeal." Id. at 245. Also,
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summary judgment and 54% were resolved through a decision on the
merits. 5  Not only did defendants prevail at a very high rate through
dismissal, judgment, or verdict, but they also prevailed at a similarly high
26rate on appeal. Of those cases appealed between 1992 and 1998,
defendants succeeded in 84% of reported cases.27 Between 1994 and 1999,
defendants triumphed in over 86% of ADA appellate cases.28 Conversely,
between 1992 and 1998, plaintiffs won in only 6% of cases at the trial court
level and in 52% of the cases in which defendants appealed these
judgments.29 Of the few cases in which plaintiffs prevailed at both the trial
and appellate levels, their rewards were reduced on appeal in 28% of
cases.30 Another statistic indicates that defendants are far more likely to
attain a reversal on appeal than are plaintiffs, with defendants attaining a
full reversal in 42% of appellate litigation and obtaining a reduction in the
damages award in an additional 17% of cases, while in contrast, plaintiffs
obtain a reversal of pro-defendant judgments in only 12% of cases.3'
Arguably, these statistics overstate defendants' victories in ADA cases
because while plaintiffs may not be succeeding in court, they may be
obtaining settlements to compensate them for the discrimination they
32experience. However, one plaintiffs' attorney reports that she has not
seen much of a willingness on the part of employers to settle ADA
this database is not reflective of all appellate opinions because not all unpublished opinions
are included. Id. The appellate investigations in the employment discrimination area reflect
a selection bias because the largest categories of cases that are decided on appeal are
dismissals and summary judgment motions, which are pro-defendant outcomes. Id. at 246.
Therefore, it can only be concluded that 87% of the cases appealed and made available on
Westlaw had resulted in dismissals or grants of summary judgment for defendants at the
trial court level, not that 87% of all ADA cases result in dismissals or pro-defendant
summary judgment decisions. Id. See also Wilmarth, supra note 8 (noting that the
American Bar Association reports that defendants prevailed in 92% of ADA cases between
1992 and 1997 and in over 95% of cases in federal court in 2001, but failing to clarify
whether these statistics reflect cases decided at the trial court level, at the appellate level, or
both).
25. Colker, supra note 5, at 109.
26. Id. at 108.
27. Id. at 100.
28. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Death of Section 504, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 221-22 (2002) (this statistic reflects data available on Westlaw for
the relevant period).
29. Colker, supra note 5, at 107. See also William P. Perkins & Kimberly A. Altschul,
'Toyota' Makes It a Bumpy Ride for ADA Plaintiffs, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 19, 2002, at 1 (noting
that the percentage of federal cases in which plaintiffs have prevailed under the ADA has
decreased annually, with plaintiffs prevailing in 8% of the actions brought in 1992 through
1997, 5% in 1998, 4% in 1999, and 3% in 2000).
30. Colker, supra note 5, at 108.
31. Colker, supra note 9, at 248.
32. Id. at 256.
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employment discrimination cases.33 Management attorneys are often paid
on an hourly basis, so from an economic standpoint, it is not logical for
them to counsel their clients to settle soon after a complaint is filed.
3 4
Typically, management attorneys advise their clients to try to dispense with
ADA cases on a motion for summary judgment before they offer a
settlement. 35 Because there are many coverage requirements that must be
met before the merits of the claim are reached, it often pays for employers
to attempt to obtain summary judgment before considering settlement.36
Employers would rather spend their money trying to win on summary
judgment than settling in order to limit other employees' incentives to
sue.37 Moreover, because plaintiffs typically settle for less than they seek
in litigation, it is problematic to characterize settlements as pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant outcomes."'
Although explicit settlement data are not available, the EEOC reports
that over 15% of the charges filed under the ADA from 1992 through 2000
resulted in pro-plaintiff "merit resolutions" at the pre-trial stage.39 But this
figure includes cases in which the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe
that discrimination had occurred, yet was unable to obtain a successful
conciliation.40 If the unsuccessful conciliations are removed from the
"merit resolution" category, then only 12% of all claims filed with the
EEOC resulted in outcomes favorable to plaintiffs. 4' However, 31% of the
charges filed with the EEOC resulted in "administrative closures" whereby
the plaintiffs sought right-to-sue letters without pursuing the formal merit
resolution process with the EEOC.4 2  It is possible that some of these
"administrative closure" cases resulted in pre-trial settlements, but the
33. Telephone Interview with Alice Ballard, Esq., National Employment Lawyers
Association Member (Apr. 11, 2003).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Colker, supra note 9, at 256.
39. Id. Of the "merit resolutions," about 5% resulted in settlements, 5% culminated in
withdrawals with benefits, and almost 2% terminated in successful conciliations. See U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) Charges FY 1992-FY2000, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.htm (last
modified Jan. 18, 2001).
40. Colker, supra note 9, at 256.
41. Id.
42. Id. "Administrative closures" also include cases where investigations were
terminated for reasons such as a failure to locate the charging party, the charging party
failed to respond to EEOC communications, the charged party refused to accept full relief,
and the case was mooted due to the outcome of related litigation. See Percy, supra note 12,
at 416 (finding that in the period from 1992 to 1998, about 34% of the charges filed with the
EEOC were classified as "administrative closures").
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EEOC does not collect such data.43 Because of the "administrative closure"
cases, resolution was possible for just under 70% of the charges filed with
the EEOC. 44 Considering only the resolved cases, a merit resolution was
achieved in 22% of cases filed with the EEOC if the unsuccessful
conciliations are counted as "merit resolutions. 45 This figure decreases to
17% of the cases if the unsuccessful conciliations are not counted.46 Again,
this figure is roughly the same as the success rate for prisoner tort cases.47
The average award for a case in the "merit resolution" category is
$13,406.48 After the EEOC "filters" through the charges it receives, about
88% of the cases filed are ultimately eligible to become court cases after
the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, with the EEOC finding no reasonable
cause to believe that discrimination occurred in more than half of them.49
C. Why Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Bar Continue to Initiate and Appeal
ADA Cases
Faced with staggeringly low chances of success, plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' lawyers have significantly reduced the number of claims they
bring under the ADA. In 1995, the number of claims filed with the EEOC
reached its peak with about 20,000 cases filed.5" Subsequently, the EEOC
experienced an annual decrease in the number of disability charges it
received: 17,806 in 1998, 17,007 in 1999, and 15,864 in 2000'.5  The
number of filings in 2000 represents about a 20% decline from 1995, a
mere five years earlier.52
43. Colker, supra note 9, at 256.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Percy, supra note 12, at 416 (finding that in the period from 1992 to
1998, 22% of EEOC claimants received a favorable outcome, including settlements,
withdrawal of charges upon receipt of benefits, and findings of reasonable cause).
47. Colker, supra note 9, at 256.
48. Id. at 257. It is not surprising that the average settlement figure for charges filed
with the EEOC is low given that claimants bear no costs in filing their claims. Moreover,
many lawyers may seek administrative closures in their strongest cases because they are
eager to seek a settlement or trial court victory for their client and see little monetary benefit
through their participation in the EEOC conciliation process. The low average size of award
gained through the EEOC's process would not be sufficient to pay a lawyer on an hourly or
contingency fee basis. Id. Thus, it may be rational for lawyers to opt out of the EEOC's
process, especially because the average award where a plaintiff obtains a trial victory is over
$100,000. Id. See also Percy, supra note 12, at 416 (noting that monetary benefits awarded
through settlements and conciliation agreements totaled more than $211 million between
1992 and 1998).
49. Colker, supra note 9, at 257.
50. Loomis, supra note 11, at 8.
51. Perkins & Altschul, supra note 29, at 4.
52. Loomis, supra note 11, at 8.
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Although plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers have reacted to their grim
chances of success by decreasing the number of ADA cases they
commence, they continue to initiate and appeal a seemingly
disproportionate number of cases despite such unfavorable statistics. Four
factors may explain this apparent irrationality. First, in the initial
generation of cases interpreting a statute such as the ADA, the decision of
plaintiffs' lawyers to bring and appeal cases under that statute may be
colored by their experience litigating similar cases, namely those under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title VII, or the ADEA.
53
Plaintiffs' lawyers may overestimate their prospects of winning ADA cases
if their experiences in related areas of law have been more promising.54 At
the trial court level, it is possible that plaintiffs' attorneys miscalculate their
chances of prevailing in the lower courts based on their more frequent
positive outcomes under section 504, the precursor to the ADA.55
Moreover, on the eve of the ADA's enactment, plaintiffs' success rate on
appeal under section 504 was about 35%, considerably higher than under
the ADA, which perhaps partially clarifies why the plaintiff bar still takes
on the risk of an appeal.56 Plaintiffs' lawyers may also have not anticipated
the pro-defendant ways in which courts would adjudicate ADA cases,
especially where the courts' methodologies run counter to prior decisions
under section 504. 57 For example, as will be discussed in greater detail in
section II of this paper, the courts' use of the summary judgment device
and the courts' failure to defer to EEOC regulations, particularly in the
most pro-defendant circuits, contradict precedent under section 504. 58
Finally, pro-plaintiff section 504 cases, such as PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin5 9
and School Board v. Arline,
6° as well as the ADA case Bragdon v. Abbott,
6 1
62
continue to give plaintiffs' attorneys hope for their clients. Because the
plaintiffs in these decisions continued to perform most life activities with
little difficulty and did not experience what many attorneys regard as
seriously disabling conditions, attorneys are still willing to take a chance
53. Colker, supra note 5, at 110 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id.
55. Colker, supra note 9, at 262-63.
56. Colker, supra note 28, at 223-24.
57. Colker, supra note 5, at 110.
58. Id.
59. 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (determining that a golfer with a leg circulation condition that
partly limited his ability to walk was entitled to coverage under the ADA).
60. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (finding a plaintiff with tuberculosis to be covered by the
ADA).
61. 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that a plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV was disabled
under the ADA).
62. See Ballard, supra note 33 (discussing the implications of these cases upon the
plaintiff bar).
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61under the ADA where they view their clients as more gravely disabled.
Second, the instability and inconsistency in ADA caselaw forces
plaintiffs to continually adjust to a moving target. 64 The conditions for a
major adjustment in the plaintiff bar's behavior have not yet occurred under
the ADA because of the lag time between Supreme Court decisions and
lower court litigation.65 ADA cases have been and continue to be filed in
the lower courts before the Supreme Court has yet rendered a
comprehensive set of decisions defining what it means to be disabled. 66 It
will take several more years for a new generation of cases to be filed that
have incorporated the Supreme Court's new set of rules, and by then, the
Supreme Court may have rendered other conservative decisions that
67plaintiffs' lawyers have thus far not anticipated. Consequently, the
predicate for "rational litigation" may not yet exist for the plaintiff bar.68
Third, plaintiffs' lawyers might continue to appeal adverse decisions,
despite their poor statistical odds, because they have simply determined
that the lower courts have made egregious errors that have some possibility
of being corrected on appeal. 69 Alternatively, their decisions to appeal
might result from the fact that they have a substantially more positive sense
of their clients' cases than do the trial courts.7°
Finally, plaintiffs' lawyers may also be unaware of the statistics or
may simply not believe they apply to the particular case they are
litigating.7 Many plaintiffs' lawyers feel outraged at how disabled
employees are treated and have difficulty turning down non-meritorious
cases because their general sense of fairness is violated by such cases.72
Many lawyers and their clients falsely think disabled employees are
entitled to certain protections and special treatment, such as believing that
an employee cannot be fired when he is out on disability, receiving
workers' compensation, or in possession of a doctor's note.73 They also
often incorrectly assume that disabled employees are entitled to work on
"light duty"-jobs reserved for employees who have been out on workers'
compensation-and are required to return to work in less physically
demanding positions.74 This "folk law" creates rampant misperceptions
63. Id.
64. Colker, supra note 9, at 264.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 264-65.
67. Id. at 265.
68. Id.
69. Colker, supra note 5, at 109.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 109-10.
72. Ballard, supra note 33.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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among plaintiffs' attorneys and inflates their perceived chances of success,
leading them to improperly use the ADA to try to obtain such benefits for
their clients. 75 Thus, many "blind alleys" exist that lawyers will venture
76down once or twice before realizing the error of their ways.
II. FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN PLAINTIFFS' EXTENSIVE LOSSES UNDER THE
ADA
No single factor accounts for the success or failure of a particular
plaintiff under the ADA. However, when ADA cases are examined
collectively, certain trends emerge that explain plaintiffs' high failure rate.
The combined data demonstrates that several procedural and substantive
factors operate in conjunction to hinder plaintiffs' ability to win, thus
rendering the ADA a meaningless statute for many who face disability
discrimination in employment. The most significant factors contributing to
pro-defendant outcomes in ADA cases are: (1) the courts' abuse of the
summary judgment device; (2) the courts' failure to defer to the EEOC's
guidance; (3) the apparent hostility of some courts, particularly in
conservative circuits, to ADA claims; (4) the EEOC's infrequent
participation in plaintiffs' ADA litigation; and (5) the Supreme Court's use
of the ADA's flexible and ambiguous language to narrow the potential
grounds of recovery for ADA plaintiffs 7
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Colker, supra note 9, at 271-76. It is interesting to note the factors that do not
significantly affect whether an ADA plaintiff wins or loses: the theory of disability asserted
by the plaintiff, the defenses raised by the defendant, and the plaintiff's occupation. See id.
at 271-76. Although the type of impairment alleged by the plaintiff was somewhat
statistically significant in the database of appellate outcomes from 1992 to 1998, Ms. Colker
predicted that its statistical significance would diminish or even reverse in light of the
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions narrowing the definition of disability. Id. at 273-74.
Plaintiffs who alleged extremities impairments or impairments due to diabetes were more
likely to prevail than other plaintiffs. Id. at 273. The plaintiffs with extremities
impairments had a variety of problems ranging from arthritis to amputated limbs, but not
including back injuries. Id. Additionally, Ms. Colker found the type of discrimination
asserted to be statistically significant, but did not consider this factor to be among the most
important in determining plaintiffs' appellate outcomes. Id. at 271-72. According to her
data, a plaintiff who alleged a discriminatory demotion was much more likely to prevail
than other plaintiffs. Id. at 272. Such plaintiffs had a 13% chance of prevailing whereas
plaintiffs alleging other forms of discrimination had between a 1% and 5% chance of
prevailing. Id. Moreover, harassment claims correlated with plaintiff loss. Id. The data
also revealed that whether the defendant was a public or private entity was not significant in
predicting appellate outcomes. Id. at 275. Finally, Ms. Colker ruled out the possibility that
judicial uncertainty, stemming from the ADA's status as a new statute, is a factor in
predicting ADA outcomes. Id. at 258. She rejected this potential explanation because
judicial outcomes have remained relatively constant and pro-defendant since 1994. Id. at
242.
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A. Courts' Abuse of the Summary Judgment Device in ADA Cases
Federal district and appellate courts hearing ADA cases are arguably
abusing the summary judgment device with the result that plaintiffs are
unjustly deprived of both their right to a jury trial and their potential right
to compensation under the ADA. One defense attorney even admits that
ADA cases "are mostly decided for the employer on summary judgment by
the trial judge, without a jury ever hearing the story."78 The abuse of the
summary judgment device occurs in two ways. First, district courts refuse
to send normative factual questions to the jury and instead substitute their
own normative judgments. 9 This abuse of the summary judgment device
affects overall substantive outcomes because plaintiffs fare better in jury
trials than in bench trials in both employment discrimination and civil
rights cases.8° Second, courts also abuse the summary judgment device by
creating an impossibly high threshold of proof necessary for defeating a
summary judgment motion." In particular, courts ignore that the defendant
might bear the burden of proof when seeking summary judgment on issues
such as whether a plaintiff poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.82 Courts often grant summary judgment for the defendant on such
issues despite what appear to be genuine issues of fact raised by the
plaintiff.83
1. Normative Factual Questions Intended for the Jury
Normative factual questions such as whether a plaintiff has a
"disability," whether a requested accommodation is "reasonable," whether
a plaintiff is "qualified" to perform the "essential" functions of a job,
whether a hardship imposed by an accommodation is "undue," or whether a
purported threat poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others
should be sent to a jury.84 Although it is difficult to determine when a
question involves the type of normative factual question that is appropriate
for a jury, courts typically use a functional test to make this
85determination. Prior practices of the courts regarding similar types of
questions should be given strong consideration in applying the functional
86test. Thus, the best source of analogy would undeniably be the caselaw
78. Wilmarth, supra note 8.
79. Colker, supra note 5, at 101.
80. Id. at 102.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 111-12.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Id.
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under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act since Congress explicitly
requires the ADA to be interpreted consistently with section 504.87 The
section 504 caselaw strongly suggests that many of the questions raised by
the ADA require normative judgments and factual inferences that should be
decided by a jury rather than by a judge if the evidence presents a genuine
88
issue of material fact. The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
have mostly characterized disability-related issues under section 504 as
factual in nature.
89
The ADA uses everyday terms like "substantial limitation," "direct
threat," "reasonable accommodation," and "undue hardship," all of which
clearly require some normative evaluation.90 Although a judge would need
to instruct a jury on the statutory definitions of such terms, ultimately some
person or group must determine whether a limitation places an individual
outside the norms of society, whether a threat to health or safety is
significant, whether there is a reasonable accommodation that would permit
a plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job, and whether a
hardship is undue.91 To determine that a particular plaintiffs handicap
qualifies as a "disability" requires jury deliberation is a more challenging
question, although there are strong indications that it does. 92 The ADA
itself and the regulations passed pursuant thereto compel an individualized
inquiry into whether a person is disabled.93 The Supreme Court approved
this approach in Bragdon v. Abbott,94 where it held that the plaintiff was
87. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations issued by
Federal agencies pursuant to such title.").
88. Id. at 111-12.
89. Id. at 112. For example, in Arline, the Supreme Court stressed the factual nature of
the direct threat defense in a case involving the contagiousness of a teacher with a record of
tuberculosis. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987). See also Katz v. City Metal
Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the questions of whether a plaintiff is
disabled and whether a plaintiff was fired because of his or her disability are questions of
fact, so long as the facts make these issues "debatable question[s]").
90. Id. at 114.
91. Id. at 114-15.
92. Id. at 115.
93. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994) ("The term 'disability' means with respect to
an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual .... ").
The ADA and this part, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not attempt a 'laundry
list' of impairments that are 'disabilities.' The determination of whether an individual
has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment
the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1998).
94. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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disabled as a result of his HIV infection, but declined to hold that an HIV
infection is inherently a disability under the ADA.95
2. An ADA Plaintiff's Burden on a Motion for Summary Judgment
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.96 has increased the burden on plaintiffs in defeating a motion
for summary judgment, mandating that the non-moving party go beyond
the pleadings to defeat the motion.97 However, the plaintiff "need only
present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor.,
98
Anderson dictates that the amount of evidence needed to defeat a motion
for summary judgment is contingent on the type of inquiry at issue, i.e., the
inquiry involved in ruling on a motion for summary judgment implicates
the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at trial. 99
Thus, in ADA cases, a court should determine whether a plaintiff can
defeat a motion for summary judgment on these normative, factual issues
by taking into account the plaintiffs evidentiary burden.'0° Plaintiffs bear
the burden of proving they are disabled and that an accommodation is
reasonable under the ADA, while defendants bear the burden of proving
that a proposed accommodation creates an undue hardship, that a risk of
harm is a "direct threat," or that a medical examination of an incumbent
employee is "job-related and consistent with business necessity."' O'
Consequently, it should be easier for a plaintiff to defeat a defendant's
motion for summary judgment on issues such as "direct threat" than on
issues such as the definition of "disability"' ' 2 However, even on those
issues on which the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof, the plaintiff
does not have to offer uncontroverted proof simply to get the case to a
jury.'0 3 ADA plaintiffs need only offer proof under the preponderance of
evidence standard.1°4
95. Colker, supra note 5, at 115 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641-42).
96. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
97. Colker, supra note 5, at 116-17 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257).
98. Id. at 117 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4)(A) (1994)).
102. Id. at 117-18.
103. Id. at 118.
104. Id.
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3. The Appellate and Trial Courts' Documented Abuse of the
Summary Judgment Device
The ordinary language of the ADA, coupled with section 504's
precedent, indicates that a jury, not a judge, should decide genuine issues of
material fact under the ADA because the resolution of these issues depends
on individualized findings. Nevertheless, courts routinely decide fact-
intensive cases without sending them to a jury. 0 5  One scholar has
documented a trend that overwhelmingly demonstrates that judges in the
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
decide most normative, factual questions in ADA cases."' The Sixth
Circuit case EEOC v. Prevo's Family Market, Inc.'0 7 is representative of
the appellate courts' tendency to decide questions that belong in the
province of the jury and to place an improperly large burden of proof on
the plaintiff in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact. 1 8 In Prevo's Family Market the issue was whether the employer had
unlawfully conditioned the plaintiffs continued employment upon his
revealing the results of an HIV examination.' °9 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff and the jury awarded him
compensatory and punitive damages." ° The Sixth Circuit reversed the
grant of summary judgment and ruled that the trial court should have
granted summary judgment for the defendant, failing to consider that the
defendant had the burden of proving that the HIV examination request was
lawful."' Thus, the appellate court ignored Anderson's mandate that a
court must take into account the evidentiary burden of proof in deciding
whether summary judgment is appropriate.1 2  Additionally, the Sixth
Circuit's decision implied there was not sufficient evidence of genuine
issues of material fact even though the jury's award of $45,000 in punitive
damages suggested the jury did not believe the defendant's argument that it
was acting reasonably and in good faith." 3 By remanding the case to the
trial court to grant summary judgment for the defendant, the Sixth Circuit
effectively instructed the lower courts to grant motions for summary
judgment despite disputed factual records and issues on which the moving
105. Id. at 115-16.
106. Id. at 119.
107. 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998).
108. Colker, supra note 5, at 120.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., No. 1:95 CV 446, 1996 WL 604984,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 1996), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir.
1998)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 121.
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party bore the burden of proof.' 4 Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit is far
from alone in its approach to granting summary judgment in ADA cases.
Viewed collectively, appellate courts are often "too quick to take cases
from juries as well as too willing to render judgments in favor of
defendants.""'
Regrettably, the appellate courts' consistent message regarding the use
of the summary judgment device has not gone unheeded by the district
courts. An evaluation of trial court data collected by the ABA suggests that
these appellate cases are reflective of a similar pattern at the trial court
level." '6 Thirty-eight percent of trial court cases that were not appealed
were resolved through summary judgment in favor of the defendant-
employer, while only 1% were resolved through summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff."7 Although it is unclear from this data what
percentage of the cases decided on the merits were actually decided by a
jury, it is obvious that a minimum of 39% of the cases were decided by a
judge without assistance from a jury.'
8
These appellate and trial court patterns documenting the frequent
abuse of the summary judgment device are disturbing because they run
counter to Congress's intent in passing the ADA." 9 Congress's declaration
at the time of the ADA's enactment that there were about forty-three
million disabled Americans shows that Congress did "not intend the courts
to consider instances of discrimination to be rare, isolated events."'
' 20
Rather, Congress expected the courts to use realistic burdens of proof to
reflect its belief that discrimination was pervasive and required swift
redress.'2' In deciding normative, factual questions and in misallocating
parties' burdens of proof, the courts are depriving ADA plaintiffs of their
statutory rights, thus rendering the ADA an empty promise.
B. Courts' Failure to Defer to the EEOC's Guidance in Interpreting the
ADA
1.Congress's Clear Intent that the Courts Defer to the EEOC in
Interpreting the ADA
The courts' refusal to defer to the EEOC's guidance in interpreting the
114. Id.
115. Id. at 125.
116. Id. at 125-26.
117. Id. at 126.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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ADA has also contributed to the prevalence of pro-defendant outcomes.
122
Despite the fact that the plain language of the ADA instructs courts to abide
by agency interpretations of the ADA, many lower courts nonetheless
decline to do SO. 12 3 The ADA specifically requires courts to defer to the
EEOC's historic views under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as well
as the EEOC's contemporaneous views under the ADA. 24  Congress
expressly delegated enforcement of the employment discrimination
provisions of the ADA to the EEOC. 125  Adhering to the ADA's
requirement that employment regulations be issued within one year of the
date of the ADA's enactment, the EEOC published final rules, which
contained an appendix entitled "Interpretive Guidance.' 26 Thus, not only
was the EEOC required by Congress to draft regulations, but the EEOC
also did so in a manner that is usually accorded the highest judicial
deference. 27  Moreover, agency regulations are especially entitled to
deference when it is evident that Congress approves of them. 28 By directly
incorporating preexisting section 504 of the EEOC regulations into the
ADA, Congress unambiguously indicated that it endorsed the agency's
historical interpretation of disability discrimination law. 129  Congress's
incorporation of section 504 regulations into the ADA reflected its
satisfaction with the regulatory process, as well as its expectation that the
courts would defer to agency expertise when interpreting the ADA's
language. 3 °
The ADA states that courts should interpret the ADA consistently
122. Id. at 101.
123. Id. See also § 12,117(b) (1994) (requiring the EEOC to promulgate regulations that
prevent conflicting standards when reviewing complaints); 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a) (1994)
("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794(e))) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to
such title.").
124. Colker, supra note 5, at 134. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a) (1994) (denoting the
importance of and guidance offered by the regulations issued by federal agencies).
125. Colker, supra note 5, at 134. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (1994) ("Commission shall
issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter."); see also Percy,
supra note 12, at 415-16 (describing the charge of the EEOC).
126. Colker, supra note 5, at 134. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (1994) (noting the EEOC's
ability to issue regulations). In 1990, the EEOC issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking in which it sought comments on the definition of terms such as disability,
reasonable accommodation, and undue hardship. See 55 Fed. Reg. 31,192 (Aug. 1, 1990).
Seven months later, the EEOC published a notice of proposed rulemaking. This proposed
rulemaking included both regulations and an appendix containing interpretive guidelines.
See 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (Feb. 28, 1991).
127. Colker, supra note 5, at 134.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 135.
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with section 504's precedent.13 ' Thus, it is instructive to examine the
amount of deference accorded to the views of the administrative agencies
charged with enforcing section 504 in order to ascertain the degree of
deference due to the EEOC in its enforcement of the ADA. 132  The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the lower courts should defer to
the views of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), and the Department of the Health and Human Services (HHS) in
interpreting section 504.133 Because Congress enacted the ADA against the
backdrop of section 504, which sent a firm message of judicial deference to
agency regulations, Congress intended to delegate to the EEOC a
commensurate amount of authority as was delegated to the HEW and the
HHS. 134 Congress also expected an equivalent amount of judicial deference
to the EEOC's regulations.
35
2. Why the Courts Fail to Defer to the EEOC Under the ADA
Although the courts are supposed to give the same degree of deference
to the EEOC as was given to the administrative agencies under section 504,
the courts have instead accorded the EEOC the same degree of deference
under the ADA as they do under Title VII and the ADEA. 116 And, much as
the courts reflexively disregard the EEOC's views under Title VII and the
ADEA, the courts also decline to abide by the EEOC's regulations under
the ADA. 137 The courts have historically regarded the EEOC as having
second-class status under Title VII because the EEOC was only given
limited authority to promulgate regulations under Title VII.1 38 Therefore,
the Supreme Court has regularly rejected the EEOC's positions under Title
VII. 139 Similarly, under the ADEA, the EEOC was not given enforcement
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984) (holding that
agency deference is particularly appropriate under section 504 because of the general
principle that courts should defer to the contemporaneous regulations issued by the agency
responsible for implementing a congressional enactment); see also Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty.
Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1987) (relying on the HHS's regulations because they
provide an important source of guidance on interpreting the meanirg of section 504).
134. Colker, supra note 5, at 138-39 (explaining how Congress specifically delegated
authority to federal agencies to promulgate regulations under section 504, and how the
Supreme Court subsequently deferred to the views of HEW and HHS in interpreting section
504).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 139.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 139-40.
139. Id. at 140. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (rejecting
the EEOC's position that Title VII applies extraterritorially to regulate employment
practices of American employers employing American citizens abroad); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
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authority, and therefore the authority to promulgate regulations, until more
than ten years after the ADEA was enacted. 140 Thus, the Supreme Court
has also refused to defer to the EEOC's regulations under the ADEA.1
4 1
As a consequence of the second-class status accorded to the EEOC
under Title VII and the ADEA, the courts appear to automatically assess
the EEOC's views under the ADA in the same non-deferential manner.1
42
Rather than deciding how much deference to give the EEOC under the
ADA, the courts have often inquired whether they should give the EEOC
any deference at all. 43  But in light of Congress's clear intent and the
legislative history of the ADA, such a lack of respect for the agency's
regulations and such a drastic reformulation of the role of the EEOC are
plainly inappropriate.
3.Instances Where the Courts Have Refused to Defer to the EEOC's
Guidance
In some cases, the courts have not rejected the EEOC's guidance
outright, but have simply not given it the weight it deserves.'44 However,
in other cases, the courts have forthrightly disregarded the EEOC's
guidance.45 Within the first six years of the ADA, several courts-namely
the First, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits-rejected EEOC guidance on
mitigating measures, 46 the subterfuge exception, 47 and the collective
bargaining rule.
148
For example, in Gilday v. Mecosta County,149 the Sixth Circuit
expressly declined to follow the EEOC's guidance in a "mitigating
measures" case. 50 The court remanded the case because of the existence of
a genuine issue of a material fact, but two of the three judges explicitly
rejected the EEOC's interpretive guidance on "mitigating measures.''.
These two judges found that the EEOC's interpretive guidance conflicted
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (rejecting EEOC guidelines on coverage of pregnancy-based
discrimination under Title VII).
140. Colker, supra note 5, at 141.
141. Id. See, e.g., Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989)
(finding the EEOC's interpretive regulation construing the "subterfuge" rule to be invalid
based on a conflict between the plain language of the statute and the EEOC rule).
142. Colker, supra note 5, at 144.
143. Id. at 144-45.
144. Id. at 146.
145. Id.
146. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1998); Colker, supra note 5, at 144-45.
147. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(f) (1998); Colker, supra note 5, at 145.
148. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1998); Colker, supra note 5, at 145.
149. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
150. Id. at 766-67.
151. Id. at 766-68.
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with the text of the ADA, despite the rule's arguable consistency with the
legislative history. 52 Moreover, none of the judges thought the EEOC's
guidance was binding law, but rather that it was merely an "interpretive
rule," subject to less deference than a "legislative rule."'
53
Thus, much as courts are committing substantial errors of law by
abusing the summary judgment device, the courts are also committing
substantial errors of law by failing to defer to the EEOC's guidance in clear
contravention of congressional intent. Although some courts may regard
EEOC regulations as too "pro-plaintiff," the job of the courts is to apply the
law as Congress mandates, and not to substitute their own judgments for
those of Congress or those of the agencies that Congress has vested with
enforcement authority.
C. The Apparent Hostility of Certain Circuits to ADA Claims
Although perhaps more of an explanation for why courts commonly
abuse the summary judgment device and refuse to defer to the EEOC's
guidance than an independent factor accounting for plaintiffs' high failure
rate, the evident hostility of certain circuits, particularly conservative
circuits, to ADA claims significantly contributes to plaintiffs' losses.
5 4
However, the circuit in which a plaintiff litigates undoubtedly correlates
with whether the plaintiff wins or loses.' 55 The D.C., Second, and Third
Circuits are significantly more likely to produce pro-plaintiff results than
the Sixth Circuit.156 The highly conservative Fourth Circuit is significantly
more likely to produce pro-defendant results than the Sixth Circuit.'57
Overall, the figures suggest that a plaintiffs probability of success is
lowest in the Fourth Circuit and highest in the D.C. Circuit, ranging from
less than 1% to about 15%. '
Although there is no hard evidence to prove why the courts, especially
152. Id. at 767.
153. Id. at 763 n.2, 766.
154. The evident hostility of certain circuits, particularly conservative circuits, to ADA
claims significantly contributes to plaintiffs' losses. Admittedly, courts' hostility to such
claims may be more of an explanation for why courts abuse the summary judgment device
and refuse to defer to the EEOC's guidance than an independent factor accounting for
plaintiffs' losses.
155. Colker, supra note 9, at 274, 275 tbl.17.
156. Id. at 274. The Third Circuit results, however, may have been affected by its
notoriously low publication rate. Third Circuit results are skewed toward plaintiffs because
the court does not make its unpublished decisions available to electronic sources. Id. at 274
tbl.16, 275 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What
Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REv. 71, 91 n.70
(2001)).
157. Id. at 274, 275 tbl.17.
158. Id. at 275 tbl.17.
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those in certain circuits, are hostile to ADA claims, several reasons may
explain this phenomenon. Conservative courts may employ tools such as
summary judgment because they desire to keep cases away from what they
perceive as runaway juries.159 Judges may have become displeased with
jury verdicts under Title VII and the ADEA and transferred those ill
feelings to the ADA by preventing jury trials. 6 They may refuse to defer
to agency regulations not only because of their habit of disregarding EEOC
expertise under Title VII and the ADEA, but also because they believe that
the EEOC regulations are overly pro-plaintiff.61  These trends may have
not arisen under section 504 because judges may have been more
comfortable rendering pro-plaintiff verdicts under section 504 than they
now are under the ADA. 16 Furthermore, in applying the ADA, judges may
have looked more to Title VH and the ADEA than to section 504 for
163guidance because Title VU and the ADEA also regulate private entities.
Yet courts' hostility to ADA claims cannot be fully explained by the
courts' experiences with Title VII and ADEA cases. Although a pro-
defendant trend exists for Title VII and ADEA claims, there is a more
significant correlation between pro-defendant victories and the ADA than
exists under Title VII or the ADEA.' 64 However, when a Title VII or an
ADEA theory is presented as part of an ADA case, the lawsuit can be
expected to succeed at about the same rate as a straight ADA case.161
Conversely, Title VII, and ADEA plaintiffs fare much better than ADA
plaintiffs when they bring a claim that is not necessarily part of an ADA
lawsuit.
166
An alternative explanation for why judges respond so negatively to
ADA claims may be that they are reacting to the EEOC's and select courts'
early liberal constructions of the ADA. For instance, EEOC regulations
broadly interpreted "mitigating measures," "the subterfuge exception," and
the "collective bargaining rule.' 67 Perhaps in recent years, judges have
sought to retract the scope of the ADA and regain control over its coverage
because they believe that it was interpreted too broadly. However, judges
are mistaken if they operate based on this rationale, because at least since
159. Colker, supra note 5, at 160.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 161. The defendants in section 504 cases are entities receiving federal
financial assistance, in contrast to the private sector entities largely covered by the ADA.
163. Id.
164. Colker, supra note 9, at 252 (finding that Title VII plaintiffs fare much better than
ADA plaintiffs when they bring a claim that is not necessarily part of an ADA lawsuit).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Colker, supra note 5, at 145.
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1992, a highly pro-defendant trend has existed in ADA Title I cases.
1 6 8
Although the implications of and explanations for courts' anti-ADA
bias are not completely clear, it appears that many judges are so prejudiced
against individuals with disabilities that they look disfavorably on any
lawsuit brought by a disabled individual. 169 Although in all cases a judge's
personal dislike for a type of claim has the potential to hinder a plaintiffs
ability to succeed, the systemic bias against ADA plaintiffs, particularly in
conservative circuits, drastically increases a plaintiffs prospect of
encountering such a judge. Because the prejudice against plaintiffs is
endemic at both the trial and appellate court levels, many plaintiffs are
flatly denied the opportunity to a fair and impartial court.
D. The EEOC's Infrequent Participation in Litigation as an Amicus
Although the EEOC does not have much clout in terms of a court's
willingness to defer to EEOC guidance under the ADA, the participation of
the EEOC in a plaintiffs litigation does substantially improve a plaintiffs
probability of victory. 70  When the EEOC intervenes as an amicus, an
ADA plaintiffs predicted success rate increases from less than 3% to
18%. 17 ' However, EEOC participation as an amicus is rare, with one
commentator finding EEOC participation in only forty-two of 720 appellate
cases. 72 Although the EEOC evidently uses its resources effectively in
advocating on behalf of oft-successful plaintiffs, the EEOC's limited
resource base prevents it from helping effectuate more pro-plaintiff
outcomes. Moreover, the EEOC's restricted funds prevent it from amply
investigating plaintiffs' charges and sufficiently pursuing settlements where
evidence of discrimination is present. With greater financial backing, the
EEOC could increase its intervention in the more than 40% of the cases
filed where it issues a right-to-sue letter based on reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination has occurred, but does little else to aid plaintiffs.
168. Colker, supra note 9, at 259 n.55 (noting that the ABA reported a consistently high
win rate for employers from 1992 to 1997).
169. Id. at 252.
170. Id. at 276-77. It is also evident that a pro se plaintiff is much more likely to lose an
ADA case than a plaintiff represented by counsel. See id. at 239.
171. Id. at 277. It should be noted, however, that EEOC participation as an amicus may
not have caused the pro-plaintiff outcomes. Id. at 276. Rather, the EEOC might have
chosen to participate in cases where plaintiffs were already likely to win. Id. Moreover, the
EEOC's participation as a party did not significantly correlate with a pro-plaintiff outcome.
Id. But there were only eight cases in the author's database where the EEOC participated as
a party, thereby making it difficult to find statistical significance. Id. With more data, Ms.
Colker posits that she might find that the EEOC's status as a party is a significant factor. Id.
Alternatively, the EEOC's participation as an amicus might prove less objectionable to
some judges than the EEOC's participation as a party. Id.
172. Id. at 276.
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If the EEOC received more funding, both courts and employers might be
less apt to regard the EEOC as a toothless organization and become more
prone to follow its guidance. But if no additional funds are appropriated to
the EEOC, its ability to participate in plaintiffs' litigation will continue to
only benefit a select few.
E. The Supreme Court Has Used the ADA's Flexible and Ambiguous
Statutory Language to Narrow the Grounds for Recovery Under the ADA
Although the Supreme Court has historically been less active in the
development of the ADA than it has been in the development of statutes
such as Title VII, recent Supreme Court decisions have substantially
narrowed fundamental ADA rights and the coverage of the ADA. 7 3 The
Supreme Court's recent ADA cases establish more conservative positions
than those put forth by the EEOC, leaving plaintiffs with increasingly
limited grounds for recovery. 174 Additionally, on average, the Supreme
Court has been more conservative than the appellate courts in deciding
ADA cases. 175 For example, the overwhelming majority of appellate courts
have accepted a broader definition of "disability" than was eventually
accepted by the Supreme Court. 176  Although the Supreme Court has
rendered some pro-plaintiff decisions under the ADA, practicing lawyers in
all but the Fourth Circuit would probably conclude that their chances of
success are better before the lower appellate courts than before the
Supreme Court. 177  However, with the recent proliferation of Supreme
Court decisions construing the ADA, the conservative trend will inevitably
trickle down into the lower courts, further solidifying hostility toward ADA
plaintiffs and thus reducing their chances of winning further.
173. Id. at 261-62, n.57. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (finding that
municipalities are not subject to punitive damages in an ADA suit); US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (stating that an employer need not accommodate a disabled
employee when it would violate a seniority system already in place); Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that in order for a person to be
"substantially limited" in a major life activity, he or she must be severely restricted in
performing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives-e.g.,
household chores, bathing, brushing one's teeth-not just work-related tasks); Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999), and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (concluding
that individuals claiming the ADA's protections must be evaluated in their corrected state).
174. See supra note 173.
175. Colker, supra note 9, at 262.
176. Id.
177. Id. (noting the narrow definition of disability used in the Fourth Circuit). An
example of a pro-plaintiff Supreme Court decision is Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998) (holding that under the ADA, HIV infection was a "disability" even though it had not
progressed to the so-called symptomatic phase).
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1. The ADA's Intentionally Vague Language Embodies the Principles
of Flexibility and Balance
The Supreme Court has limited the ADA's coverage and plaintiffs'
potential grounds for recovery by interpreting the ADA's flexible and
ambiguous statutory language to narrowly define such issues as who is
disabled, what requested accommodations are reasonable, and what
constitutes major life activities.1 78 The language in the ADA regarding
such issues as coverage and employers' obligations is inherently and
intentionally vague, a product of political compromise.' 79 At the time of
the ADA's passage, this vagueness was not seen as problematic because
the ADA's language is similar to that of the Rehabilitation Act. 8° For
almost two decades, courts had been construing the Rehabilitation Act's
language to cover people with a wide range of health conditions. 181
Unfortunately, the courts of the 1970s and 1980s, which had liberally
embraced the Rehabilitation Act, were changing, as was the Supreme
Court. 82 By the time ADA cases reached the Supreme Court, it had a
conservative majority with little interest in an expansive reading of civil
rights laws. 83 The ADA's nebulous and adaptable language proved
problematic for such a legalistic court, leading to rigid, textual
constructions of the ADA's coverage.184
Admittedly, the language of Title I of the ADA embodies not only the
principle of flexibility, but also the principle of balance. 85 The ADA's
statutory language does not contain a long list of specific declarations about
what employers must do or not do to comply with regulatory mandates.
86
Rather, the ADA requires broadly defined affirmative accommodations for
persons with disabilities and specifies basic operating principles that allow
flexibility in attaining compliance, while attempting to balance the needs of
people with disabilities with the costs incurred by employers. 8 7  For
example, although Title I requires covered employers to make reasonable
accommodations to employ persons with disabilities, this mandate is
tempered by the stipulation that accommodations are not required when the
178. See supra note 173.
179. Marcia Coyle, Series of High Court Rulings Limit Scope of Disabilities Act, N.Y.
L.J. Jan. 31, 2002, at 5.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Percy, supra note 12, at 414.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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"covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operations of the business of the covered entity."' 8
The ADA provides additional flexibility in ascertaining whether and when
undue hardship occurs "by allowing certain factors to be weighed in this
determination-for example, overall financial resources of the entity,
number of employees, type of business operation, and the cost of the
accommodation-without specifying a cost-based formula to be
utilized."'189 In essence, the ADA purposefully does not seek to explicitly
define all mandates or answer all questions about implementation. 9 '
Instead, the ADA challenges employers and disabled employees to find
creative solutions that can meet individual needs, while it also considers the
cost or the disruption experienced by employers as they make
accommodations.'91
On the upside, the ADA's principles of flexibility and balance may
foster innovative solutions for employers and employees. But the
downside, particularly in the early years prior to establishment of general
understandings and administrative and legal precedent, is that the federal
courts are granted a key role in defining the reach and breadth of the ADA,
rendering case-by-case determinations as to plaintiffs' rights. 92 Moreover,
as discussed above in Section II(A), the courts have largely refused to let
juries make these case-by-case determinations, further ensuring the ADA
plaintiffs' defeat.
2.Cases Where the Supreme Court Has Justified its Pro-Defendant
Outcomes Using the ADA's Ambiguous Language
The Court endorsed the case-by-case approach previously in
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg93 and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.'
94
and most recently in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams.'95 The Court has repeatedly stressed that a "one size fits all"
approach to the ADA, wherein a particular medical impairment is conferred
ADA disability status, is inappropriate.'96 Justifying its decisions based on
the ADA's flexible and ambiguous language and on its balancing
requirement, the Court has recently used the case-by-case approach to
arrive at principally pro-defendant outcomes. For example, in a 1999
188. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (1994)).
189. Percy, supra note 12, at 414.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 414-15.
192. Id. at 415.
193. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
194. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
195. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999).
196. Perkins & Altschul, supra note 29, at 4.
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trilogy of decisions--Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.-the Supreme Court essentially held that individuals claiming
the ADA's protection must be evaluated in their corrected states. 197 The
Court opposed the EEOC's position on this issue. 9 8 Thus, people who use
medication, medical devices, or other measures to fully correct their
impairments are not considered disabled under the ADA.' 99 Because the
ADA does not expressly list which particular impairments qualify someone
as disabled, the Court was able to justify this exclusion in the ADA's
coverage. The Court looked to the ADA's plain language, stating that
"because the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the present
indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring
that a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability. ' 2° Of course, the Court added
that the ADA does protect people who are still substantially limited in a
major life activity after taking medication or using a medical device, thus
reiterating the statute's requirement that the determination of a disability
must be made on a case-by-case basis. 20' The Court believed that holding
otherwise would create a system where an individual would often be
treated as a member of a group having similar impairments, rather than as a
person whose situation should be assessed on an individualized basis,
202
However, the Court's assurance is likely of little comfort to the millions of
people consequently eliminated from the ADA's coverage.0 3 Subsequent
to this trio of decisions, courts have found people with bipolar disorder,
epilepsy, diabetes, prosthetic legs, and other conditions outside the ADA's
protection even if the person argues that he or she was discriminated
against because of that mitigated condition.2°
Because the ADA does not specify what constitutes a major life
activity, the Sutton Court managed to find support for its holding that a
person must show he or she is limited in a broad class of jobs, not just in
performing a particular job-a very challenging case for a plaintiff to
make.20 5 In Sutton, the plaintiffs argued that they were substantially limited
197. Coyle, supra note 179, at 8. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 566 (addressing a case
where a one-eyed truck driver was terminated by his employer); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (describing a case where a truck mechanic lost his job
because of high blood pressure that was controllable through medication); Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 483 (discussing how pilots were denied employment by an airline because of near-
sightedness even though their vision was correctable with contact lenses).
198. Coyle, supra note 179, at 8.
199. Fried, supra note 10, at 5.
200. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
201. Id. at 483.
202. Id.
203. Coyle, supra note 179, at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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in the major life activity of working since United Airlines failed to hire
206them. The Court rejected this claim, responding that because the
plaintiffs could be employed by other airlines that did not impose the same
vision requirement on pilots, they are not substantially limited in working
and thus, are not covered by the ADA.20 7 Here, too, the Court's position
conflicted with that of the EEOC, which defined major life activity to
include working, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, caring for
208one's self, walking, and performing manual tasks.
While management attorneys say that the Court's narrowing of the
definition of disability reduces the number of frivolous suits, plaintiffs'
lawyers lament that these decisions have led to fewer good cases being
filed and to a greater likelihood of employers prevailing on summary
judgment.0 9 Plaintiffs' lawyers further complain that the Court's decisions
erroneously give employers the right to discriminate against those with
treatable conditions.2 0 Plaintiffs' lawyers state that they cannot imagine
that Congress intended to exclude a huge number of people from ADA
coverage because these people are trying to function as best as they can on
the job.2 1' One of the drafters of the ADA attacked the Court's decisions as
"creat[ing] the absurd result of a person being disabled enough to be fired
from a job, but not disabled enough to challenge the firing. 212 Effectively,
the Sutton trilogy stands for the proposition that even though a disabling
condition represents a limitation of a major life activity (e.g., sight, blood
circulation) and that the conditions, even when corrected, lead to job
termination, the ADA does not apply.213 Moreover, since employers are
now legally permitted to refuse to hire or retain employees despite their
correctable disabilities, the potential exists for major insurance companies
to offer price incentives to employers who discriminate against applicants
or employees with disabilities such as depression, diabetes, and thyroid
214conditions, who are fully functioning but medically expensive.
Most recently, in Toyota, the Court again narrowed the class of
disabled individuals protected under the ADA by developing the meaning
of "substantially limited." The Court held that in order for a person to be
"substantially limited" in a major life activity, he or she must be severely
restricted in performing activities that are of central importance to most
206. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 476 (1999).
207. Id. at 493.
208. Fried, supra note 10, at 5.
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id.
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212. Percy, supra note 12, at 431 (citing Linda Greenhouse, High Court Limits Who is
Protected by Disability Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at 1).
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people's daily lives (e.g., household chores, bathing, brushing one's teeth),
not just work-related tasks.215 The Court said that the ADA must be strictly
construed "to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled ....,,216 Although some plaintiffs' lawyers say that Toyota is
nothing new in principle, they fear that lower courts could use it to raise the
bar higher for claimants with difficulties doing manual tasks.217 Other
plaintiffs' lawyers worry that in order for a plaintiff to qualify as disabled,
he would have to show that he cannot brush his teeth, comb his hair, or
wash his face, but he can still perform the manual tasks required in a job.218
Whatever the ultimate effects of Toyota prove to be, Toyota undeniably
continues the Court's trend in construing the ADA's ambiguous language
so as to weigh the interests of the employer more heavily than those of the
employee.
Toyota and the Sutton line of cases illustrate how the ADA's
deliberately vague language, intended to provide broad protection for
disabled individuals, has come back to haunt the statute's drafters and
advocates and ultimately, the disabled community itself. One ADA drafter
noted in hindsight that disabilities activists now concede that Congress did
not use the right words to convey its intent to expand the Rehabilitation
219Act's protections. Congress may have not realized the difficulty of
defining the elusive "disability" concept. The Court has failed to recognize
that even though some elements of the ADA provide flexibility in crafting
accommodations so as to balance required accommodations against the
costs incurred in achieving compliance, the ADA simultaneously creates an
expansive anti-discrimination mandate. 220 The ADA's pliability means it
should be interpreted as comprehensive in scope and application. 21 1 Many
key definitions were purposefully left open-ended to effectuate a liberal
22interpretation, such as the definition of persons covered under the Act.
In seeking to avoid unnecessarily limiting the ADA's coverage, the drafters
chose not to include a list of disabling conditions or circumstances that
would trigger legal protection under the ADA.223 Rather, they opted to use
a definition that focused on the conditions that impair "major life
activities"-current, past, or perceived by others.224 This wide-rangingdefinition signals an aggressive approach to triggering protections under
215. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
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the ADA.225
Regrettably, the Supreme Court has instead viewed this language as an
invitation to continually narrow disabled individuals' rights. Those who
support the Court's restricted reading of the ADA would obviously counter
that if Congress disapproved of the Court's approach, then Congress would
react by amending the ADA. Although this argument may have merit, it
does not excuse the Court's blatant rejection of explicit statements of
congressional intent, as well as EEOC regulations, with which the ADA
specifically mandates compliance. Even management attorneys admit that
"for those of us practicing since [the ADA's] enactment, we would have
speculated in the earlier years that there would have been more
comprehensive coverage of the disabled in the workplace than interpreted
by the Supreme Court., 226 Another attorney concedes that even though she
normally represents employers, she thinks that "the ADA has been
interpreted much more narrowly than Congress intended and that hard-
working disabled employees are rightly disappointed that the ADA has
become a very ineffective tool for their plight."
227
III. THE FUTURE FOR ADA TITLE I PLAINTIFFS
In light of the many procedural and substantive legal obstacles faced
by ADA plaintiffs, their successes are unjustifiably few. The federal courts
are largely responsible for the current inhospitable status of the ADA
toward plaintiffs. They have interpreted and applied the ADA so as to
eviscerate Congress's legislative intent. Consequently, the courts have
stripped many arguably deserving plaintiffs of their statutory rights,
rendering the ADA an unfulfilled promise.
Two alternatives remain for plaintiffs, plaintiffs' lawyers, and
disability advocates. First, they could lobby Congress to amend the ADA
in order to reinvest it with Congress's original intent. In fact, many ADA
proponents are now urging Congress to respond to the Sutton trio of cases
and Toyota by elucidating that the ADA's ambiguous statutory language
was intended to expansively cover a large class of disabled individuals.228
If Congress more specifically defines key terms in the ADA, courts will
have less room to mold the ADA to their personal visions of who and what
it is intended to cover.
225. Id.
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Additionally, Congress should be encouraged to reaffirm the
respective burdens of proof for employers and employees under the ADA.
It should also be persuaded to rewrite the ADA so as to underscore which
questions under the ADA are meant for jury deliberation and which are for
the courts. Moreover, Congress should be lobbied to revise the ADA so as
to emphasize to the courts that they should give greater deference to EEOC
regulations and should attempt to interpret the ADA in a manner consistent
with the regulations. Congress should explicitly vest the EEOC with the
authority to issue regulations interpreting the term "disability." Congress
cannot rid the judiciary of its bias against ADA cases. But if Congress
made substantive changes and clarifications to the ADA, courts would be
less capable of couching their hostility toward ADA claims in legalistic
explanations. Explicit congressional intent as to the ADA's coverage
would give courts less discretion in interpreting the law and would compel
more pro-plaintiff outcomes, despite the judges' particular views as to the
desirability of ADA lawsuits. Finally, Congress should be convinced to
appropriate more funding for the EEOC so that it can more effectively
carry out its statutory duties. If the EEOC had more resources, it could
better investigate ADA claims as well as pursue more claims on behalf of
plaintiffs with meritorious cases.
Although legislative intervention would clearly be the most
advantageous route for ADA supporters, this path presents many
challenges. The ambiguous language of the ADA partly reflects the
difficulty that Congress initially had in passing the statute. Convincing
Congress, particularly the current conservative Congress, to enact a more
precise civil rights statute seems unlikely. Moreover, many of the desired
changes to the ADA, such as strengthening the EEOC, would require
greater congressional expenditures. Making the recommended changes to
the ADA would also impose increased fiscal burdens on employers, a
constituency favored by the current Congress. Perhaps Congress could
designate certain funds to assist employers in providing employment
accommodations to disabled employees, thus preventing the filing of some
ADA charges. 229  However, this change would also require greater
financing from the federal government, making its feasibility questionable.
Thus, while eventual changes to the ADA are possible, imminent
amendments seem improbable until a more liberal Congress takes control.
The second alternative is that ADA advocates could accept that until
Congress strengthens and clarifies the ADA's protections, or until the
courts are reconstituted with more liberal judges, state law must be relied
upon to fill the ADA's void. Attorneys representing both management and
employees already predict that plaintiffs will increasingly turn to state law
229. Percy, supra note 12, at 435.
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and state legislatures for protections against disability discrimination.3
However, as one commentator has noted, it would be ironic if employees
were forced to depend on state law because "disability discrimination is a
federal problem and the ADA . .. was designed to end a hodgepodge of
state protections."2 ' In states like New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey, where the state laws define disability more broadly than the current
ADA caselaw, disabled employees will continue to obtain relief.
232
However, those disabled employees in states such as Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, where the disability laws mirror
the ADA or where the state supreme courts interpret state disability law in
accordance with the ADA, will remain remediless.233 In states like New
Jersey where there is a strong disability statute that includes no
administrative exhaustion requirement prior to the filing of a suit, a two-
year statute of limitations, a right to a jury trial, and where the state
supreme court aspires to provide more protection for disabled individuals
than under the federal system, plaintiffs will fare much better than their
23counterparts in neighboring Pennsylvania.  In Pennsylvania, the state law
is interpreted to comport with the ADA and plaintiffs have no right to a
235jury trial. Thus, not only will the deterioration of the ADA continue to
affect the number of federal suits brought, it will also reduce the number of
236suits initiated in states where the laws mimic the ADA. Finally, unlike
under federal law, some state laws that protect the disabled, such as New
237York law, do not provide for attorneys' fees or punitive damages.
Without these remedies available, plaintiffs' attorneys may be even more
reluctant to accept such cases. 238  Therefore, while state remedies can
substitute for the ADA in some jurisdictions, state laws as a whole cannot
satisfactorily replace the ADA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the future effectiveness of the ADA is uncertain, the ADA
has forever changed the workplace by making employers much more
230. Coyle, supra note 179; see also Perkins & Altschul, supra note 29 (describing the
decrease in the number of federal disability charges received by the EEOC); Fried, supra
note 10 (stating that many predict a larger number of plaintiffs will seek relief under state
laws that provide broader protection than the ADA).
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239sensitive to disabled employees than they were prior to its passage.
While ADA plaintiffs recover at a much lower rate than was originally
hoped for, a wide variety of disabled individuals with a diverse array of
disabling conditions have used the protections of the ADA to fight
discrimination and have received damages or other redress. 24° But, the
empirical data existing on the ADA presents a grim image of the reality
faced by the average ADA plaintiff. Furthermore, the known statistics
portray only a partial picture of the ADA's efficacy because they fail to
measure or address such key issues as how many disabled people
experience discrimination, how many know of ADA protections, and how
many are unwilling or incapable of using the ADA to redress the
discrimination they encounter. 41 Until these questions can be answered-
vast questions given the number of people experiencing mental or physical
disabilities and the number of private and public sector entities regulated by
the ADA-we will not be able to answer, with complete confidence, the
fundamental question of how successful the ADA is in eliminating
discrimination based on disability.242 However, even if the answers to these
questions reveal an unexpectedly positive outlook for disabled individuals,
until ADA employment discrimination plaintiffs begin to prevail in more
cases, many will continue to regard the ADA as an empty promise.
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